Cognitive Biases, Dark Patterns, and the ‘Privacy Paradox’ by Waldman, Ari Ezra
DigitalCommons@NYLS 
Articles & Chapters Faculty Scholarship 
2020 
Cognitive Biases, Dark Patterns, and the ‘Privacy Paradox’ 
Ari Ezra Waldman 
New York Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/fac_articles_chapters 
 Part of the Privacy Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Waldman, Ari Ezra, "Cognitive Biases, Dark Patterns, and the ‘Privacy Paradox’" (2020). Articles & 
Chapters. 1332. 
https://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/fac_articles_chapters/1332 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at DigitalCommons@NYLS. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Articles & Chapters by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@NYLS. 
Cognitive biases, dark patterns, and the ‘privacy paradox’
Ari Ezra Waldman1,2
Scholars and commentators often argue that individuals do not
care about their privacy, and that users routinely trade privacy
for convenience. This ignores the cognitive biases and design
tactics platforms use to manipulate users into disclosing
information. This essay highlights some of those cognitive
biases – from hyperbolic discounting to the problem of
overchoice – and discusses the ways in which platform design
can manipulate disclosure. It then explains how current law
allows this manipulative and anti-consumer behavior to
continue and proposes a new approach to reign in the
phenomenon.
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Introduction
Privacy scholars have long argued that most individuals
make rational disclosure decisions. Westin [46] used the
phrase ‘privacy pragmatists’ to describe this majority:
pragmatists are forward-looking, utility-maximizing,
and base their decisions to share on how the information
in front of them compares to their privacy preferences.
Privacy pragmatists are rational actors in the classical
model. This rational choice model of disclosure deci-
sion-making informs the dominant approach to privacy
governance in the United States: notice-and-consent
[33]. Notice and consent is, at bottom, an informed
consent framework that requires websites and other data
collectors to be transparent about the ways in which they
collect, analyze, and distribute user data, allowing users to
rational privacy decisions for themselves.
In 2007, however, Norberg et al. [31] found inconsisten-
cies between our stated privacy preferences and our
actual disclosure behavior. They called these inconsis-
tencies the ‘privacy paradox.’ That is, internet users assert
strong interest in privacy while simultaneously disclosing
substantial personal information for meager rewards.
Rationalists try to explain the paradox with nods to the
contextual nature of disclosure. Huberman et al. [20], for
example, suggest that individuals demand a greater price
for disclosing stigmatized, less desirable, or embarrassing
data, but are quite willing to disclose information they
perceive as harmless or innocuous for little to no rewards.
But disclosure choices are not made in vacuums. Sharing
is contextual [4], and contingent on both mental capacity
and constraints placed on us by designers. In this essay,
I offer an alternative explanation for the yawning gap
between individuals’ disclosure behavior and stated
privacy preferences: Any supposed paradox does not
reflect users’ disinterest in privacy; rather, it reflects users
responding in predictable ways to the ways in which
platforms leverage design to take advantage of our cogni-
tive limitations.
Moreover, social scientists have debunked many of the
assumptions of human decision-making on which the
rational-actor disclosure model is based [38,23,6]. Recent
literature shows that individuals do not make rational
disclosure decisions online [3]. Cognitive biases make
rationality difficult and so-called ‘dark patterns’, or design
tricks platforms use to manipulate users into taking
actions they might otherwise have not, weaponize the
design of built online environments to harm consumers
and their privacy [26,9]. What’s more, a rational-actor
regime is a largely ineffective way of giving individuals
control over the dissemination of their data. It is, in fact,
designed to fail [35,19]. A rational choice model
leverages metacognitive processes that encourage users
to give up, to become nihilists about their privacy, and to
cede what little control they do have back to technology
companies [30,39].
Privacy decision-making
The ‘privacy paradox’ and the correlative rational actor
model behind the notice-and-consent regime is based on
the myth of rational disclosure. The myth is practically
dangerous and systematically unsound.
Practical problems
Today, we have too much data, too many data collection
pathways, and too much opacity about those pathways. In
that context, notice-and-consent is ill-equipped to inform
Available online at www.sciencedirect.com
ScienceDirect
www.sciencedirect.com Current Opinion in Psychology 2020, 31:105–109
users of corporate data use practices. The regime’s chief
tools—privacy policies—are long [28] and inscrutable;
even experts find them misleading [33]. Cranor [12]
estimates that it would take a user an average of 244 hours
per year to read the privacy policies of every website she
visits, or 54 billion hours per year for every United States
consumer to read every privacy policy she encountered
[27]. Therefore, even if users were capable of making
rational disclosure decisions, privacy policies’ inability to
adequately convey information means users are unable to
do so in practice [34].
There is also an entire industry of data brokers that
collects vast amounts of data on individuals in secret
and without consent. The Federal Trade Commission
[16], the United States’ consumer and de facto privacy
watchdog, found that one data broker’s “databases con-
tain information about 700 million consumers worldwide
with over 3000 data segments for nearly every U.S.
consumer” and “[m]uch of this activity takes place
without consumers’ knowledge.” As a practical matter,
consent cannot operate in a world of passive, secret data
collection.
Cognitive biases
The rational choice model is ineffective. It also fails to
describe privacy decision-making. Individuals have
bounded rationality, which limits their ability to acquire
all relevant information and translate it into an evidence-
based decision [37]. Recent research has identified
myriad cognitive and behavioral barriers to rational
privacy and disclosure decision-making [2]. I will discuss
the five most pervasive ones here.
The first is what psychologists call anchoring, or the
disproportionate reliance on the information first avail-
able when we make decisions. For example, Ariely [7]
asked experiment participants to provide the last two
digits of their Social Security Numbers and then estimate
the price of a consumer good. Participants’ estimates were
close to the two digits they first provided, even though
there should be no rational connection between random
identity numbers and consumer prices. More recently,
Chang et al. [10] showed anchoring effects when he
showed that individuals were more likely to disclose
personal information after seeing examples of increas-
ingly salacious selfie images. The pictures anchored the
participants’ perception of what is appropriate to disclose.
Anchoring, therefore, can skew individuals’ disclosure
behavior based on what they see others have shared.
Framing is a second form of bias that technology compa-
nies manipulate regularly. Framing concerns the way in
which an opportunity is presented to consumers—
namely, either as a good thing or a bad thing. Positively
framing a privacy policy or a product as more protective of
consumer privacy than a competitor’s results in a higher
propensity to disclose personal information [5]. This is
why technology companies explain their data use prac-
tices with leading language: “if you don’t allow cookies,
website functionality will be diminished” or “opting in to
data collection will enable new and easier functionality”.
This has the effect of establishing the positives of data
collection while glossing over or ignoring the negatives.
Third, hyperbolic discounting, or the tendency to over-
weight the immediate consequences of a decision and to
underweight those that will occur in the future, makes it
difficult for consumers to make rational disclosure deci-
sions. Disclosure often carries with it certain immediate
benefits—convenience, access, or social engagement, to
name just a few. But the risks of disclosure are usually
only felt much later. As such, our tendency to overvalue
current rewards while inadequately discounting the cost
of future risks makes us more willing to share now. For
example, Jentzsch et al. [21] found that people preferred
barely less expensive movie tickets even though the
cheaper ticket required more extensive personal informa-
tion. Yet, consumer choices changed when tickets were
offered at the same price—the privacy protective movie
company won more customers. The authors concluded
that consumers were heavily discounting the risks associ-
ated with disclosing personal information, even far below
small differences in price. Other studies have shown that
consumers make disclosure decisions without fully appre-
ciating time inconsistent preferences. Wang et al. [45]
found that users of social networks may gain some imme-
diate pleasure from posting a salacious selfie, but often
end up regretting it later and wish they had never posted
the picture in the first place. And Acquisti and Fong [1]
found that users do not appreciate that posting religious,
sexual, or marital status information could result in
employment discrimination or ostracism in the future.
A fourth common cognitive barrier to rational disclosure
decision-making is overchoice. Overchoice is the problem
of having too many choices, which can overwhelm and
paralyze consumers [36]. A form of overchoice affects
internet and mobile app users trying to navigate their
privacy. When making disclosure choices, Hartzog [19]
has shown that users are overwhelmed not with the
choices they have, but with the number of choices they
have to make. Most apps, websites, and platforms require
us to make yes/no choices with respect to cookies, loca-
tion tracking, and behavioral targeting, among others.
Indeed, as Olmstead and Atkinson [32] have shown,
mobile apps often ask users for more than 200 permis-
sions, with the average app asking for about five. It is hard
to see how ordinary users, without any particular techno-
logical expertise, can navigate it all.
Finally, metacognitive processes in decision-making
impair individuals’ ability to make choices that accurately
reflect their preferences. As Mourey [30] has shown,
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when some individuals are confronted with difficult
choices, they perceive difficulty as a signal of importance,
encouraging them to deploy strong cognitive processes to
a meaningful or weighty decision. But when individuals
perceive difficulty as a cue of impossibility, they tend to
give up, ceding their power and autonomy to choose to
the default. When applied to the content of privacy
navigation and online disclosure, it stands to reason that
the more users feel it is difficult to maintain their privacy
online, as many do, the more likely many of them are to
nihilistically decline to manage their disclosure.
Design and ‘dark patterns’
Even if none of these cognitive hurdles to rational disclo-
sure decision-making existed, internet users would still
face the limitations imposed on them by design. By
‘design’, I am following Hartzog’s [19] broad definition,
which embraces the “processes that create consumer
technologies and the results of their creative processes
instantiated in hardware and software.” Science and Tech-
nology Studies has long recognized that the design of built
environments constrains human behavior [47]. The same
is true online [13,19], and even more so when millions, if
not billions, of people with potentially different prefer-
ences are using the same service. As Hartzog [18] has
noted, “[t]he realities of technology at scale mean that
the services we use must necessarily be built in a way
that constraints our choices.” Users can only click on
the buttons or select the options presented to them; we
can only opt-out of the options from which a website allows
us to opt-out. Harris [17] likens the power of design to
manipulate user choices to a magician’s misdirection: “we
ignore how . . . [our] choices are manipulated upstream
by menus we didn’t choose in the first place. . . . This is
exactly what magicians do. They give people the illusion of
free choice while architecting the menu so that they win,
no matter what you choose. . . . By shaping the menus we
pick from, technology hijacks the way we perceive our
choices and replaces them with new ones.” We see this
throughout the digital ecosystem. Facebook tells us when
our friends have ‘liked’ a page, encouraging us to do the
same; dark patterns trigger our preference for shiny but-
tons over grey ones; platforms nudge us to buy products
others have bought before us; and apps gamify sharing by
encouraging us to continue a ‘streak’ with our friends. The
list goes on.
At a minimum, the power of design means that our choices
do not always reflect our real personal preferences. At
worst, online platforms manipulate us into keeping the
data flowing, fueling an information-hungry business
model. That manipulation is often the result of so-called
‘dark patterns’ in platform design. Mathur et al. [26]
define dark patterns as “interface design choices that
benefit an online service by coercing, steering, or deceiving
users into making decisions that, if fully informed and
capable of selecting alternatives, they might not make.”
And they are increasingly common. Designers use dark
patterns to hide, deceive, and goad users into disclosure.
They confuse users by asking questions in ways nonexperts
cannot understand, they obfuscate by hiding interface
elements that could help users protect their privacy, they
require registration and associated disclosures in order to
access functionality, and hide malicious behavior in the
abyss of legalese privacy policies. Dark patterns also make
disclosure ‘irresistible’ by connecting information sharing
to in-app benefits. In these and other ways, designers
intentionally make it difficult for users to effectuate their
privacy preferences.
Online platforms are also socially constructed, designed
by real people with biases both implicit and explicit
[14,24]. Although there are, in fact, several social groups
involved in the creation and design of websites, apps, and
other data collection platforms—from executives and
lawyers to marketers and users—the mostly white male
engineers and technologists on the ground play a critical
role in channeling ideas into design [24,40]. As such,
theirs is the vision most likely integrated into code [40].
The biases of these designers not only damage our
privacy [40,44], but may also constrain one group of
consumers more than others, whether it is Asians who
cannot use a ‘smart’ camera because the camera’s artificial
intelligence thinks all Asians have their eyes closed when
posing for pictures [25] or an app in which location
tracking cannot be turned off regardless of the potential
for harm to women and stalking victims [11].
Trust and privacy
The design of built online environments and our cogni-
tive biases make rational disclosure decision-making
difficult. Therefore, the disconnect between users’ stated
preferences and disclosure behavior has been misunder-
stood. The evidence suggests that individuals care about
their privacy. They are, however, dissuaded from acting
effectively on those preferences by cognitive limitations
leveraged by the digital platforms themselves.
Nor is disclosure arbitrary. As we have seen, it can be
manipulated in specific, multidirectional ways. The contex-
tual nature of disclosure and privacy [4] means that we can
explain some sharing of personal data through principles of
trust and corporate attempts to manipulate that trust.
Trust, a resource of social capital between or among two
or more parties concerning the expectation that others
will behave according to accepted norms, is a powerful
predictor of a willingness to share personal information
online [43]. Trust is the ‘favorable expectation regard-
ing other people’s actions and intentions,’ or the belief
that others will behave in a predictable manner [29]. For
example, when an individual speaks with relative
strangers in a support group like Alcoholics Anonymous,
she trusts that they will not divulge her secrets. Trust,
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therefore, includes a willingness to accept some risk and
vulnerability toward others and steps in to grease the
wheels of social activity.
We share our information with others in contexts of trust
[22,43]. When we learn that others have shared personal
information, we share, as well [42]. When we know our
close friends participate in an online social network, we
are more likely to participate, as well. When someone
shares a stigmatizing social identity, we are more likely to
share personal information with them [42]. We develop
privacy management techniques based on indicia of trust.
This means that trust is a target of design and manipula-
tion. Dark patterns may hide, confuse, and obfuscate, but
they do so without users knowing [26]. The only thing
users see are nudges to behave in certain ways. Dark
patterns can hide disclosure dangers while simulta-
neously highlighting the powerful social cues to share.
Facebook, for example, introduces and follows every
News Feed post with information about which friends
and how many of them have ‘liked’ or shared the content.
Websites cue trust through professional design while
hiding their invasive data collection practices in inscruta-
ble privacy policies [43].
As such, privacy law should reflect the fact that we share
data with others in contexts of trust, that rational choice
inadequately describes our disclosure decision-making,
and that users must be protected from unfair and manip-
ulated disclosure. We entrust our information to digital
platforms much like we entrust our financial information
to estate planners or our medical information to doctors or
our legal situation with lawyers [8]. The law requires
those parties to act in a trustworthy manner. They are, in
fact, trustees, or fiduciaries, of our data: we are vulnerable
to them, we depend on them, and they hold themselves
out as experts and trustworthy [8]. As such, they should
also be responsible for acting in our benefit or, at least, not
acting in ways that benefit them at our expense. In
particular, this notion of ‘information fiduciaries’ requires
three things: duties of care, duties of confidentiality, and
duties of loyalty. Duties of care would require technology
companies to take reasonable steps to secure our data,
with ‘reasonable’ defined by centuries of common law.
Duties of confidentiality would require those who collect
our data to collect only so much as necessary to achieve a
particular purpose and limit the use of collected data to
specific purposes to which users consent. And duties of
loyalty would ensure that companies do not profit by
harming us. To put it another way, treating data collectors
as fiduciaries of our data would ban their use of dark
patterns to manipulate and coerce disclosure of our per-
sonal information. Recent legislation proposed by U.S.
Senator Brian Schatz (D-Hawaii) proposes to integrate
these fiduciary principles of care, confidentiality, and
loyalty into a comprehensive United States federal
privacy law [15,41]. It deserves consideration particularly
because it reflects the latest research on how disclosure
can be manipulated by cognitive biases and coercive
design.
Conclusion
Many internet users care about their privacy. And yet,
technology companies have made design choices that
make it difficult for users to realize those preferences.
Online environments are built not only to constrain users,
but to coerce disclosure and trigger cognitive biases that
encourage us to give up and cede control over our privacy.
Online platforms can behave in these predatory ways
because the law, based on the myth of rational disclosure,
allows them. A different approach, one based on the
connection between trust and sharing, would hold online
platforms to a higher standard of loyalty, confidentiality,
and care.
Conflict of interest statement
Nothing declared.
References and recommended reading
Papers of particular interest, published within the period of review,
have been highlighted as:
 of special interest
 of outstanding interest
1. Acquisti A, Fong CM: An Experiment in Hiring Discrimination Via
Online Social Networks. . Available at SSRN 2031979 2014:1-81.
2. Acquisti A, Brandimarte L, Loewenstein G: Privacy and human
behavior in the age of information. Science 2015:509-514.
3. Acquisti A, Grossklags J: What can behavioral economics teach
us about privacy. In Digital Privacy: Theory, Technologies, and
Practices. Edited by Acquisti A, Gritzalis S, Lambrinoudakis C, di
Vimercati S. 2007:363-377.
4. Acquisti A, John L, Loewenstein G: The impact of relative
standards on the propensity to disclose. J Mark Res 2012,
49:160-174.
5. Adjerid I, Acquisti A, Brandimarte L, Loewenstein G: Sleights of
privacy: framing, disclosures, and the limits of transparency.
Proceedings of the Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security
(SOUPS’13) ACM 2013:1-11.
6. Ariely D: Predictably Irrational: The Hidden Forces That Shape Our
Decisions. HarperCollins Publishers; 2008.
7. Ariely D, Loewenstein G, Prelec D: “Coherent arbitrariness”:
stable demand curves without stable preferences. Q J Econ
2003, 118:73-106.
8. Balkin J: Information fiduciaries and the first amendment. Univ
Calif Davis Law Rev 2016, 49:1183-1234.




Chang D, Krupka EL, Adar E, Acquisti A: Engineering information
disclosure: norm shaping designs. Proceedings of the
Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems (CHI’16),
ACM 2016:587-597.
Study showing the ways in which design patterns can affect disclosure
behavior. In particular, showing that individuals are more willing to share
personal information as they are shown more revealing images, and
notably more likely to disclose if being shown revealing images changes
their perception of what is appropriate to share.
11. Citron DK: Spying, Inc. Wash Lee Law Rev 2015, 72:1243-1282.
108 Privacy and disclosure, online and in social interactions
Current Opinion in Psychology 2020, 31:105–109 www.sciencedirect.com
12. Cranor LF: Necessary but not sufficient: standardized methods
for privacy notice an choice. J Telecommun High Technol Law
2012, 10:273-307.




Crawford K, Whittaker M, Elish MC, Barocas S, Plasek A,
Ferryman K: The AI Now Report: The Social and Economic
Implications of Artificial Intelligence Technologies in the Near-
Term. 2016:1-25.
Demonstrating, through field research, the human biases translated into
the design of new technologies. In particular, noting the biases in data
used as inputs for artificial intelligence and the biases of the male-
dominated design workforce.
15. Data Care Act, https://www.schatz.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/
Data%20Care%20Act%20of%202018.pdf.
16. Federal Trade Commission: Data Brokers: A Call for Transparency
and Accountability. 2014.
17. Harris T: How technology is hijacking your mind—from a magician
and Google design ethicist. Medium. 2016. November 2018.
18.

Hartzog W: The case against idealizing control. Eur Data Prot
Law Rev 2018, 4:423-432.
Arguing, that traditional approaches to data protection—giving users
‘control’ over their information—fail for several reasons, including the
overuse of consents, cognitive hurdles, and design strategies.
19.

Hartzog W: Privacy’s Blueprint: The Battle to Control the Design of
New Technologies. Harvard University Press; 2018.
Calling for a design agenda at the regulatory level to protect individuals
from data privacy harms and documenting the many ways in which the
design of online environments nudges and manipulates user behavior.
20. Huberman BA, Adar E, Fine LR: Valuating privacy. IEEE Secur
Priv 2005, 3:22-25.
21. Jentzsch N, Preibusch S, Harasser A: Study on Monetising Privacy:
An Economic Model for Pricing Personal Information. European
Union Agency for Network and Inf. Sec. (ENISA); 2012.
22. JourardSM:The Transparent Self.VanNostrandReinhold Inc.; 1971.




Katyal SK: Private accountability in the age of artificial
intelligence. Univ Calif Los Angel Law Rev 2019, 66:54-141.
Identifying the many ways in which artificial intelligence tools reflect and
entrench racial and sexual biases and calling for soft law proposals, from




Levendowski A: How copyright law can fix artificial intelligence’s
implicit bias problem. Wash Law Rev 2018, 2:579-630.
Arguing that one of the reasons for bias in machine learning is the
limited data available to train machine learning algorithms because so




Mathur A, Acar G, Friedman M, Lucherini E, Mayer J, Chetty M,
Narayanan A: Dark patterns at scale: findings from a crawl of
11K shopping websites. ACM Conf. Comp.-Supported
Cooperative Work 2019.
Presenting automated research techniques to help experts identify dark
patterns on a large scale and leveraging those techniques on thousands
of websites and platforms to identify 1818 dark patterns and 183 websites
that engage in deceptive practices.
27. McDonald AM, Cranor LF: The cost of reading privacy policies.
I/S: J Law Policy Inf Soc 2008:543-568.
28. Milne GR, Culnan MJ, Greene H: A longitudinal assessment of
online privacy notice readability. J Public Policy Mark 2006,
25:238-249.
29. Mo¨llering G: The nature of trust: from Georg Simmel to a theory




Mourey JA: Prime Time: A Mental Resource Opportunity Cost
Approach to When and How Primes Influence Choice. 2019.
[In press].
Discussing several studies showing that those who interpret difficult
decisions as cuing importance approach those decisions differently than
those who interpret difficulty as cuing impossibility.
31. Norberg PA, Horne DR, Horne DA: The privacy paradox:
personal information disclosure intentions versus behaviors. J
Consum Aff 2007, 41:100-126.
32. Olmstead K, Atkinson M: Apps Permissions in the Google Play
Store. Pew Research Center; 2015.
33.

Reidenberg J, Breaux T, Cranor LF, French B: Disagreeable
privacy policies: mismatches between meaning and users’
understanding. Berkeley Technol Law J 2015, 30:39-68.
Analyzing experiments showing that ordinary users do not under-
stand the text of privacy policies and that even privacy experts either
do not understand or, at least, disagree as to the meaning of privacy
policy terms.
34. Reidenberg J, Russell NC, Callen A, Qasir S, Norton T: Privacy
harms and the effectiveness of the notice and choice
framework. I/S: J Law Policy Inf Soc 2015:485-524.
35.

Richards N, Hartzog W: The Pathologies of Consent. 2019.
[In press].
Discussing the ways in which technology companies overuse the tools of
consent to manipulate users into disclosing personal information.
36. Scheibehenne B, Greifeneder R, Todd PM: Can there ever be too
many options? A meta-analytic review of choice overload. J
Consum Res 2010, 37:409-425.
37. Simon HA: Models of Bounded Rationality. MIT Press; 1982.
38. Thaler R: Misbehaving: The Making of Behavioral Economics. W.
W. Norton & Co.; 2016.
39.

Turow J, Hennessy M, Draper N, Akanbi O, Virgilio D: Divided We
Feel: Partisan Politics Drive Americans’ Emotions Regarding
Surveillance of Low-Income Populations. Annenberg School for
Communication, University of Pennsylvania; 2018:1-30.
Finding, among other things, that most Americans feel resigned to their




Waldman A: Designing without privacy. Houst Law Rev 2018,
55:659-727.
Discussing qualitative interviews with engineers in the high technology
sector showing their narrow view of privacy and their biased approach to
design are the approaches most likely to be integrated into design, and
recommending micro and macro social and legal approaches to better
design for privacy.
41. Waldman A: Duties of loyalty and care: Sen. Brian Schatz offers
a new approach to data privacy. Medium. 2018.
42.

Waldman A: Law, privacy, and online dating: “revenge porn” in
gay online communities. Law Soc Inq 2019.
In accordance with a survey of gay and bisexual male users of geosocial
dating apps, showing a high rate of nonconsensual pornography on the




Waldman A: Privacy As Trust: Information Privacy for an
Information Age. Cambridge University Press; 2018.
Arguing that because we share when we trust, privacy law should be




Waldman A: Privacy law’s false promise. Wash Univ Law Rev
2019. [In press].
Showing that privacy technology vendors, and the engineers designing
their tools, are exerting increasing control over what privacy laws mean in
practice, threatening the protections those laws offer.
45. Wang Y, Norcie G, Komanduri S, Acquisti A, Leon PG, Cranor LF: I
regretted the minute I pressed share: a qualitative study of
regrets on Facebook. In Proceedings of the Symposium on
Usable Privacy and Security ACM. 2011:1-16.
46. Westin A: Privacy and Freedom. Bodley Head; 1970.
47. Woolgar S: Configuring the user: the case of usability trials.
Sociol Rev 1990, 38:58-99.
Cognitive biases and dark patterns Waldman 109
www.sciencedirect.com Current Opinion in Psychology 2020, 31:105–109
